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We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes in which the decision maker is inter-
ested in long but finite horizons. First we consider reachability objective: the decision maker’s
goal is to reach a specific target state with the highest possible probability. Formally, strategy σ
overtakes another strategy σ′, if the probability of reaching the target state within horizon t is
larger under σ than under σ′, for all sufficiently large t ∈ N. We prove that there exists a pure
stationary strategy that is not overtaken by any pure strategy nor by any stationary strategy,
under some condition on the transition structure and respectively under genericity. A strat-
egy that is not overtaken by any other strategy, called an overtaking optimal strategy, does not
always exist. We provide sufficient conditions for its existence.
Next we consider safety objective: the decision maker’s goal is to avoid a specific state with
the highest possible probability. We argue that the results proven for reachability objective ex-
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tend to this model. We finally discuss extensions of our results to two-player zero-sum perfect
information games.
JEL classification: C73.
Keywords: Markov decision process, reachability objective, safety objective, overtaking opti-
mality, perfect information games, Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue.
1 Introduction
We consider discrete-timeMarkov decision processes (MDP) with finite state and action spaces.
We consider two different types of objectives for the decision maker: reachability objectives
and safety objectives. The decision maker is said to have a reachability objective if his goal is to
reach a specific state of the MDP with the highest possible probability, and the decision maker
is said to have a safety objective if his goal is the opposite: to avoid a specific state of the MDP
with the highest possible probability. Both objectives are standard and have been analyzed
extensively in the literature, but they are quite different in nature (see, e.g., Baier and Katoen
(2008), Chatterjee and Henzinger (2012) and Bruyère (2017)).
An important question is onwhich time horizon the decisionmaker evaluates his strategies.
On any given finite horizon, backward induction guarantees that the decision maker has a
pure optimal strategy. Note that this optimal strategy can depend heavily on the horizon, and
generally there is no strategy that is optimal on all finite horizons. On the infinite horizon,
the decision maker has a pure stationary optimal strategy (cf. Howard (1960) and Blackwell
(1962)1).
In this paper, instead of considering a fixed horizon, we propose to evaluate strategies by
how they perform on all long but finite horizons. In particular, such an evaluation can be
meaningful if the decision maker knows that the decision process will last long, but he has no
1Howard (1960) and Blackwell (1962) consider regular MDPs where the decision maker receives a payoff at
every period depending on the state and the action played, and his goal is to maximize the total discounted sum
or the long-term average of the payoffs that he receives during the play. Our MDP with a reachability objective can
be transformed into a regular MDP (see also Sections 2 and 3) by making the target state absorbing and assigning
payoff 1 to the target state and payoff 0 to all other states.
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information on its exact length. In the case of reachability objectives, such an evaluation may
also reflect the attitude of a decision maker who is patient and can wait for many periods to
reach the target state.
More precisely, when the decision maker has a reachability objective with target state s∗, we
say that a strategy σ overtakes another strategy σ′ if there exists T ∈ N such that, on all finite
horizons t ≥ T, the probability of having visited the state s∗ within horizon t is strictly larger
under σ than under σ′. Thus, conditionally on theMDP lasting at least T periods, the strategy σ
performs better than σ′ regardless of the horizon, and consequently the decision maker should
prefer σ to σ′. When the decision maker has a safety objective and wants to avoid a state s∗, we
say that a strategy σ overtakes another strategy σ′ if there exists T ∈ N such that, on all finite
horizons t ≥ T, the probability of having visited the state s∗ within horizon t is strictly smaller
under σ than under σ′.
We also define a more permissive version of the aforementioned relations between strate-
gies. For reachability objectives, we say that a strategy σ weakly overtakes another strategy σ′
if there exists T ∈ N such that, on all finite horizons t ≥ T, the probability of having visited the
target state s∗ within horizon t under σ is at least as much as that under σ′, but strictly more for
infinitely many horizons t. A similar definition can be given for safety objectives.
Under these comparisons of strategies, we call a strategy overtaking optimal if it is not
overtaken by any other strategy, and call it strongly overtaking optimal if it is not weakly over-
taken by any other strategy. Strong overtaking optimality is a strict refinement of overtaking
optimality, and as an appealing property, they are both strict refinements of optimality on the
infinite horizon.
Our contribution. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
(I) For reachability objectives, we obtain the following results, sorted by the attributes of
the MDP:
(I.1) We prove that if the MDP is such that each action can lead to at most one non-target
state with a positive probability, then there exists a pure stationary strategy that is not weakly
overtaken by any pure strategy. This is Theorem 4. We show with Example 3 that such a
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statement does not hold for all MDPs.
(I.2) What does hold for all MDPs is Theorem 9, stating that if, from every initial state, there
is a strategy that weakly overtakes all other strategies, then there exists a stationary strongly
overtaking optimal strategy.
(I.3) We show by means of Example 2 that an overtaking optimal strategy does not always
exist. This MDP is however constructed in a very specific way and has some typically non-
generic properties.
(I.4) We consider MDPs that are “generic”, in the sense that the transition probabilities are
randomized using any non-trivial joint density function. We show for these MDPs that there
exists a pure stationary strategy that overtakes each other stationary strategy. This is Theorem
10.
(II) For safety objectives, we argue that the same results hold.
Besides, we briefly discuss extensions to two-player zero-sum perfect information games.
In these games, each state is controlled by one of the players. Player 1’s goal is to reach a
specific state (reachability objective), and player 2’s goal is to prevent it (safety objective).
Proof techniques. We use quite different proof techniques to obtain our results. For proving
result (I.1), we transform the MDP with the reachability objective into a regular MDP, by as-
signing payoffs to actions based on the immediate transition probabilities to the target state. In
this newMDP, we invoke some results in Flesch et al. (2017) to derive a specific pure stationary
strategy. We show that this strategy is exactly the desired strategy in the original MDP with
the reachability objective. This proof technique is suitable for pure strategies, but probably also
limited to them, as the relation between the twoMDPs is much weaker for non-pure strategies.
When considering generic MDPs in result (I.4), we rely on techniques from linear algebra.
The overtaking comparison between two stationary strategies can be reduced to the compari-
son of the spectral gaps of the transition matrices that these strategies induce. The spectral gap
of a transition matrix refers to the difference between the largest eigenvalue, which is equal to
1, and the modulus of the second eigenvalue, which can be a complex number. To obtain result
(I.4), we need to compare the spectral gaps of transition matrices induced by stationary and
4
pure stationary strategies.
Result (I.2) is proven in a constructive way. The mixed actions of a strategy that weakly
overtakes all other strategies can be used for the mixed actions of the desired stationary strat-
egy.
The results for (II) are proven similarly.
Related literature. Reachability and safety problems were studied both in theMDP framework
and in the context of two-player zero-sum games, for an overview we refer to Baier and Katoen
(2008) and respectively to Chatterjee and Henzinger (2012) and Bruyère (2017). An important
distinction is made between the qualitative and the quantitative approaches. The qualitative
approach is interested in the probability with which the decision maker succeeds to meet his
objective. For the quantitative approach, however, it also matters how quickly the target state
is reached in the case of a reachability objective, or how long the bad state has been avoided in
the case of a safety objective. Our overtaking approach could thus be classified as a quantitative
approach on the infinite horizon. For other quantitative approaches, we refer to Randour et al.
(2015, 2017) and the references therein, and to Brihaye et al. (2014) in a game setting.
In the game-theoretic literature, various definitions of overtaking optimality have been pro-
posed. They all serve as a refinement of optimality on the infinite horizon, based on the per-
formance of strategies on the finite horizons. For an overview of some of these concepts, we
refer to Stern (1984), Puterman (1994), Carlson et al (1991), Zaslavski (2006, 2014), Guo and
Hernàndez–Lerma (2009), and Méder et al. (2012). Our definition of overtaking optimality is a
relatively direct translation of the definitions of sporadic overtaking optimality in Stern (1984)
and Flesch et al. (2017) and repeated optimality in Méder et al. (2012), into the context of MDPs
with reachability and safety objectives.
One important feature of our definition of overtaking optimality is that it does not require
the strategy to outperform all other strategies on long but finite horizons. It only requires that
the strategy is not outperformed by any other strategy. Our definition of overtaking optimality
is therefore weaker than overtaking optimality and uniform overtaking optimality as in Stern
(1984), and weaker than strong overtaking optimality as in Nowak and Vega-Amaya (1999) or
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Leizarowitz (1996). See alsoMéder et al. (2012), who delineates ”not-outperformed”definitions
of optimality from “outperform-all” definitions of optimality.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 details the model. Then, we start by analyzing reachabil-
ity objectives. Section 3 provides an example which highlights different aspects of the concept
of overtaking optimality by comparing it with other optimality notions. Section 4 presents the
results concerning deterministic MDPs. Section 5 considers non-deterministic MDPs. Section 6
treats genericMDPs. In Section 7 we turn our attention to safety objectives. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 MDPs with a reachability objective
The model. An MDP with a reachability objective is given by [1] a finite set S of states, with a
specific state s∗ ∈ S, called the target state, [2] for each state s ∈ S, a nonempty and finite set
A(s) of actions, and [3] for each state s ∈ S and each action a ∈ A(s), a probability distribution
p(s, a) on the set S of states.
An MDP with a reachability objective is played at periods in N = {1, 2, . . .} as follows: At
period 1, in a given initial state s1 ∈ S \ {s
∗}, the decision maker chooses an action a1 ∈ A(s1),
which leads to a state s2 ∈ S drawn from the distribution p(s1, a1). At period 2, in state s2, the
decision maker chooses an action a2 ∈ A(s2), leading to state s3 drawn from p(s2, a2), and so
on. The decision maker’s goal is that state s∗ is eventually reached, that is, st = s∗ for some
t ∈ N.
Histories. The history at period t ∈ N is a sequence (s1, a1, . . . , st−1, at−1, st) such that si ∈ S for
all i = 1, . . . , t, and ai ∈ A(si) and p(si+1|si, ai) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , t− 1. We denote by Ht
the set of all histories at period t, and by H = ∪t∈NHt the set of all histories. Let s(h) denote
the final state of each history h ∈ H. Let H∞ be the set of all infinite histories, i.e., the set of
sequences (s1, a1, s2, a2, . . . ) such that si ∈ S, ai ∈ A(si), and p(si+1|si, ai) > 0 for each i ∈ N.
Strategies. Amixed action in a state s ∈ S is a probability distribution on A(s). The set of mixed
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actions in state s is denoted by ∆(A(s)).
A strategy σ is a map that, to each history h ∈ H, assigns a mixed action σ(h) ∈ ∆(A(s(h))).
The interpretation is that, if history h arises, σ recommends to choose an action in the current
state s(h) according to the probabilities given by the mixed action σ(h). A strategy σ is called
pure if σ(h) places probability 1 on one action, for each history h. A strategy σ is called station-
ary if the recommendation of the action only depends on the current state, i.e., σ(h) = σ(h′)
whenever s(h) = s(h′). Note that a pure stationary strategy can be seen as an element of
×s∈SA(s).
Starting from an initial state s, a strategy σ induces a probability measure Psσ on H∞, where
H∞ is endowed with the sigma–algebra generated by the cylinder sets. We denote the corre-
sponding expectation operator by Esσ.
Value and optimality. Let t∗ denote the first period when state s∗ is reached. If s∗ is never
reached then we define t∗ = ∞. For initial state s ∈ S, the value v(s) is defined as v(s) =
supσ Psσ(t
∗ < ∞), which is the maximal probability that state s∗ can be reached. A strategy
σ is called optimal at the initial state s if Psσ(t∗ < ∞) = v(s). Note that, for any strategy σ, it
holds that as t goes to infinity, the quantity Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) increases and converges to Psσ(t∗ < ∞).
Thus, σ is optimal at the initial state s if and only if limt→∞ Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) = v(s). It is known that
the decision maker always has a pure stationary strategy that is optimal at all initial states (cf.
Howard (1960) and Blackwell (1962)).
Overtaking optimality. We say that a strategy σ overtakes a strategy σ′ at the initial state s if
there is T ∈ N such that for all periods t ≥ T we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t). This means
that, for all periods t ≥ T, the probability under σ to reach s∗ within the first t periods is strictly
larger than that under σ′. If the decision maker is sufficiently patient with regard to his goal to
reach the target state, then he strictly prefers σ to σ′.
Note that two strategies can be incomparable in the sense that neither of them overtakes
the other one. Indeed, consider the following example. The state space is {x, s∗}. In state x,
the decision maker has three actions: a0, a1/2, a7/8. For z ∈ {0, 1/2, 7/8}, under action az, the
play moves to state s∗ with probability z, and thus remains in state x with probability 1− z.
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Now suppose that σ recommends to always play action a1/2, and σ
′ recommends to play the
sequence of actions a0, a7/8, a0, a0, a7/8, a0, . . . as long as the play is in state x. Then, at periods
t = 3k+ 1, where k ∈ N, we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) = Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) = (7/8)k. At periods t = 3k+ 2,
we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t). At periods t = 3k, we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) < Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t).
So, σ and σ′ are incomparable.
A strategy σ is called overtaking optimal at the initial state s if there is no strategy that over-
takes σ at that initial state. That is, σ is maximal with respect to the relation of “overtakes”
between strategies.
Note that any optimal strategy overtakes any strategy that is not optimal. Indeed, if σ is
optimal at the initial state s but σ′ is not, then Psσ(t∗ < ∞) = v(s) > Psσ′(t
∗ < ∞), and hence
Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) for all sufficiently large t. Consequently, an overtaking optimal
strategy at the initial state s is also optimal at that initial state. As Example 1 below will show,
the converse is not true: there exist optimal strategies at an initial state that are not overtaking
optimal at that initial state. Thus, overtaking optimality is a strict refinement of optimality.
Strong overtaking optimality. We say that a strategy σ weakly overtakes a strategy σ′ at the initial
state s if there is T ∈ N such that for all periods t ≥ T we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) ≥ Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t)
with strict inequality for infinitely many t. Note that if σ overtakes σ′ at the initial state s then
σ also weakly overtakes σ′ at that initial state.
A strategy σ is called strongly overtaking optimal at the initial state s if there is no strategy
that weakly overtakes σ at that initial state. A strongly overtaking optimal strategy at an initial
state is also overtaking optimal at that initial state.
2.2 MDPs with a safety objective
The model of MDPs with a safety objective is very similar to the model of MDPs with a reach-
ability objective, except that the decision maker’s objective is to reach the state s∗ with as low a
probability as possible.
Value and optimality. For initial state s ∈ S, the value v(s) is defined as v(s) = infσ Psσ(t∗ <
∞). A strategy σ is called optimal at the initial state s if Psσ(t∗ < ∞) = v(s). Also in this model
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it is known that the decision maker always has a pure stationary strategy that is optimal at all
initial states (cf. Howard (1960) and Blackwell (1962)).
Overtaking optimality. We say that a strategy σ overtakes a strategy σ′ at the initial state s if
there is T ∈ N such that for all periods t ≥ T we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) < Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t). A strategy
σ is called overtaking optimal at the initial state s if there is no strategy that overtakes σ at that
initial state.
Strong overtaking optimality. We say that a strategy σ weakly overtakes a strategy σ′ at the initial
state s if there is T ∈ N such that for all periods t ≥ T we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) ≤ Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t)
with strict inequality for infinitely many t. Note that if σ overtakes σ′ at the initial state s then
σ also weakly overtakes σ′ at that initial state.
A strategy σ is called strongly overtaking optimal at the initial state s if there is no strategy
that weakly overtakes σ at that initial state. A strongly overtaking optimal strategy at the initial
state s is also overtaking optimal at that initial state.
2.3 Discounted and average payoff MDPs
Wewill also consider MDPs with the discounted payoff or with the average payoff, but only as
auxiliary models in our analysis.
A discounted MDP can be described similarly to an MDP with a reachability or safety objec-
tive, but with the following modifications: (1) For each state s ∈ S and each action a ∈ A(s),
there is a payoff u(s, a) ∈ R, which the decision maker receives when action a is played in state
s. (2) The decision maker’s goal is not to reach a target state s∗, but rather to maximize the
expectation of the total discounted payoff
(1− β) · (u(s1, a1) + β · u(s2, a2) + β
2 · u(s3, a3) + · · · ),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Strategies, the discounted-value, and discounted-
optimality are defined analogously to the corresponding definitions for reachability objective.
By the results of Shapley (1953) and Blackwell (1962), it is known that for each discount factor
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β ∈ (0, 1), the decision maker has a pure stationary strategy that is β-discounted optimal at all
initial states. Moreover, the decision maker has a pure stationary strategy that is β-discounted
optimal for all β close to 1 and all initial states. Such a strategy is also called Blackwell optimal.
An average payoff MDP is similar to a discounted MDP, except that (2’) the decision maker’s
goal is to maximize the expectation of the average payoff
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
u(st, at).
The average-value, and average-optimality are defined analogously to the corresponding def-
initions for reachability objective. By Howard (1960) and Blackwell (1962), it is known that
the decision maker has a pure stationary strategy that is average-optimal at all initial states.
Moreover, each Blackwell optimal strategy is average optimal at all initial states.
3 Reachability objectives: An illustrative example
In this section, we discuss a specific MDP with a reachability objective, which demonstrates
three properties of overtaking optimality. First, there are optimal strategies that are not over-
taking optimal. That is, overtaking optimality is a strict refinement of optimality. Second,
finding overtaking optimal strategies cannot be done by simply solving a related discounted
MDP. Third, the strategy that minimizes the expected time of reaching the target state s∗ can be
different from the overtaking optimal strategies, even when the latter is unique.
Example 1. Consider anMDPwith a reachability objectivewhich has state space S = {x, y, z, s∗}
such that:
• State x is the initial state. In this state, the decision maker has two actions: a and b. Action
a leads to state s∗ with probability q and to state y with probability 1− q. Action b leads
to state s∗ with probability 12 and to state z with probability
1
2 .
• In state y, there is only one action, denoted by c, which leads to state s∗ with probability
q and to state y with probability 1− q.
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• In state z, there is only one action, denoted by d, which leads to state s∗ with probability
p and to state z with probability 1− p.
• State s∗ is the state that the decision maker tries to reach. This state is absorbing.
The probabilities p and q are such that 0 < p < q <
2p
2p+1 . For example, p = 0.1 and q = 0.11.
Note that p <
2p
2p+1 implies p < 1/2, and so q <
2p
2p+1 implies q < 1/2 as well.
TheMDP is depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, the state s∗ is omitted for simplicity, and the
names of the actions are provided together with the corresponding probabilities of moving to
state s∗.
x
y
z
c : q
d : p
a : q
b : 12
Figure 1: The MDP in Example 1.
Suppose that the initial state is x. Choosing the action a at state x leads to the following
sequence of probabilities of moving to state s∗: (q, q, q, . . .). Choosing the action b at state x
leads to the following sequence of probabilities of moving to state s∗: (1/2, p, p, . . .). The target
state s∗ is eventually reached with probability 1 under both actions a and b. Thus, both actions
are optimal in the reachability problem.
Claim 1. In Example 1, action a is overtaking optimal, and action b is not.
11
Proof. Take a period t ≥ 2. Then, under a the probability of reaching the target state s∗ within
the first t periods is
Pxa(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1− (1− q)t−1,
whereas under b this probability is
Pxb(t
∗ ≤ t) =
1
2
+
1
2
· (1− (1− p)t−2).
Thus,
Pxa(t
∗ ≤ t)−Pxb(t
∗ ≤ t) = −(1− q)t−1 +
1
2
· (1− p)t−2
= (1− p)t−2 ·
[
−
(
1− q
1− p
)t−2
· (1− q) +
1
2
]
.
Since p < q by assumption, we have (1− q)/(1− p) < 1. Hence, Pxa(t∗ ≤ t)− Pxb(t
∗ ≤ t) is
positive for large t ∈ N. This completes the proof.
Claim 2. Consider a discounted MDP which has the same state space, action spaces and transitions as
the MDP of Example 1, and has payoff equal to 1 in state s∗ and payoff 0 in all other states.
Then, for all discount factors β close to 1, action b leads to a strictly higher expected β-discounted
payoff than action a.
Proof. Note that in the discountedMDP, if state s∗ is reached at period t, then the β-discounted
payoff is equal to (1− β) · (βt−1 + βt + · · · ) = βt−1.
Thus, action a leads to the expected discounted payoff:
Da(β) = qβ + (1− q)qβ
2 + (1− q)2qβ3 + · · · = qβ
1
1− (1− q)β
,
whereas action b leads to the following expected discounted payoff:
Db(β) =
1
2
β +
1
2
· (pβ2 + (1− p)pβ3 + (1− p)2pβ4 + · · · ) =
1
2
β +
1
2
pβ2
1
1− (1− p)β
.
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As one can verify, we have
Db(β)− Da(β) =
1
2β(1− β) · [1− (1− 2p)(1− q)β − 2q]
(1− (1− p)β) · (1− (1− q)β)
.
The denominator of the fraction above is positive for all β ∈ (0, 1). Since q < 2p2p+1 by as-
sumption, the expression 1 − (1 − 2p)(1 − q) − 2q is positive. Hence, the numerator of the
fraction above is positive for large β ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the fraction above is also positive for large
β ∈ (0, 1), which implies the claim that Db(β) > Da(β) for large β ∈ (0, 1).
Claim 3. In Example 1, the expectation of the period t∗ when reaching the state s∗ is smaller under b
than under a:
Exb(t
∗) < Exa(t
∗).
Proof. We have
Exa(t
∗) = q+ 2(1− q)q+ 3q(1− q)2 + · · · =
1
q
and
Exb(t
∗) =
1
2
+
1
2
· [2p+ 3(1− p)p+ 4p(1− p)2 + · · · ] = 1+
1
2p
.
Since q <
2p
2p+1 by assumption, the claim follows.
4 Reachability objectives: Deterministic MDPs
We call an MDP with a reachability objective deterministic if for each state s 6= s∗ and every
action a ∈ A(s) there is a state z ∈ S such that p({z, s∗}|s, a) = 1. That is, for any combination
of state and action, the play moves to the target state s∗ or to a specific state that is not s∗.
The following theorem claims that, in deterministic MDPs with a reachability objective,
there always exists a pure stationary strategy that is at least as good as any pure strategy in
the overtaking sense. The main idea of the proof is to transform the MDP with a reachability
objective into an average payoff MDP. The payoffs that we assign to actions are related to the
probabilities that these actions lead to the target state.
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The condition that the MDP is deterministic plays an important role. Indeed, Example 3
will show that the result is not true in general for non-deterministic MPDs.
Theorem 4. In every deterministic MDP with a reachability objective, there exists a pure stationary
strategy that is not weakly overtaken by any other pure strategy.
For this purpose, we need the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Consider an average-payoff MDP such that2 in each state s ∈ S each action a ∈ A(s)
leads to a certain state ω(s, a) ∈ S with probability 1: p(ω(s, a)|s, a) = 1. Let σ be a Blackwell optimal
strategy. Then, there exists no pure strategy σ′ and no initial state s ∈ S with the following properties:
• there is M ∈ N such that for all periods t ≥ M we have ut(s, σ) ≤ ut(s, σ′), where ut(s, σ) and
ut(s, σ′) denote the expected average payoffs up to period t under σ and respectively under σ′ at
initial state s,
• and ut(s, σ) < ut(s, σ′) holds for infinitely many t.
Proof. (of Theorem 5) We closely follow the proof of Theorem 1 (that [1] implies [4], page 219)
in Flesch et al (2017).
Fix the initial state s. Without loss of generality assume that v(s) = 0.
A sequence ℓ = (s1, a1, s2, · · · , st, at, st+1) is called a loop if (1) s1, . . . , st are distinct elements of
S, (2) s1 = st+1, (3) ai ∈ A(si) for all i = 1, . . . , t, and (4) p(si+1|si, ai) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , t. For
a loop ℓ = (s1, a1, s2, · · · , st, at, st+1) let φ(ℓ) denote the sum of the payoffs along ℓ:
φ(ℓ) =
t
∑
n=1
u(st, at).
The number of loops is finite and therefore the following quantity δ is negative:
δ = max{φ(ℓ) : ℓ is a loop and φ(ℓ) < 0} (1)
(the definition of δ is irrelevant if the set over which the maximum is taken is empty).
2This is the standard definition of a deterministic MDP.
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Suppose that the strategy σ is Blackwell optimal for the initial state s. Let s1, a1, s2, a2, . . .
be the sequence of states and actions induced by the strategy σ, where s1 = s. Denote ut =
u(st, at).
Take any pure strategy σ′. We let s′1, a
′
1, s
′
2, a
′
2, . . . be the sequence of states and actions in-
duced by the strategy σ′, where s′1 = s, and denote u
′
t = u(s
′
t, a
′
t).
The following two claims have been proven in Flesch et al (2017, see page 220).
Claim 1: Suppose that for some k,m ∈ N we have sk = sk+m+1. Then uk + · · ·+ uk+m = 0.
Claim 2: Suppose that for some k,m ∈ N we have s′k = s
′
k+m+1. Then either u
′
k + · · ·+ u
′
k+m = 0
or u′k + · · ·+ u
′
k+m ≤ δ (recall that δ < 0).
Suppose by way of contradiction that there is M ∈ N such that uT(s, σ
′) ≥ uT(s, σ) for all
T ≥ M and the inequality is strict for an infinite sequence T1 < T2 < . . ., where M ≤ T1.
Let q1 = 0 and qt = u1 + · · ·+ ut−1 for each t ≥ 1. Likewise, let q
′
1 = 0 and q
′
t = u
′
1 + · · ·+
u′t−1 for each t ≥ 1. Due to our assumption about σ
′, we have q′t− qt > 0 for each t = T1, T2, . . ..
We next argue that there exists µ > 0 and such that
q′t − qt ≥ µ for each t = T1, T2, . . . . (2)
Indeed, suppose that no such µ > 0 exists. Then, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we can
assume that the sequence {q′Tn − qTn}n∈N is strictly decreasing. That is, q
′
Tn
− qTn > q
′
Tn+1
− qTn+1
for every n ∈ N. As is shown in Flesch et al (2017, page 220), by claims 1 and 2 above, this
leads to q′Tn − qTn < 0 for all sufficiently large n, which is a contradiction.
For each discount factor β, let uβ(s, σ) and uβ(s, σ
′) denote the expected discounted payoffs
under σ and respectively under σ′ at initial state s. Then,
uβ(s, σ)
1− β
=
∞
∑
t=1
βt−1ut
=
∞
∑
t=1
βt−1(qt+1 − qt)
=
∞
∑
t=2
βt−2qt −
∞
∑
t=1
βt−1qt
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=
∞
∑
t=2
(βt−2 − βt−1)qt.
Likewise,
uβ(s, σ
′)
1− β
=
∞
∑
t=2
(βt−2 − βt−1)q′t.
Take any β ∈ (0, 1) for which σ is β-optimal for the initial state s. Then, by Eq. (2), we obtain
0 ≥
uβ(s, σ
′)− uβ(s, σ)
1− β
=
∞
∑
t=2
(βt−2 − βt−1)(q′t − qt)
≥
T1
∑
t=2
(βt−2 − βt−1)(q′t − qt) +
∞
∑
k=1
Tk+1
∑
t=Tk+1
(βt−2 − βt−1)µ
=
T1
∑
t=2
(βt−2 − βt−1)(q′t − qt) + β
T1−1µ.
Finally, taking the limit of the last inequality as β ↑ 1, we obtain 0 ≥ µ, a contradiction.
Proof. (of Theorem 4) Consider a deterministic MDP with a reachability objective, denoted by
M. We may assume without loss of generality3 that there is no state s 6= s∗ and action a ∈ A(s)
such that p(s∗|s, a) = 1. As the MDPM is deterministic, this implies that, if z ∈ S denotes the
unique state for which p({z, s∗}|s, a) = 1, then p(z|s, a) > 0.
We define an auxiliary average payoff MDPM′ as follows:
• The state space is S′ = S− {s∗}.
• For each state s ∈ S′, the action space is the same as in the MDP M with reachability
objective: A′(s) = A(s).
• For each state s ∈ S′ and action a ∈ A(s), the transition and the payoff in M′ are de-
fined as follows: If z 6= s∗ denotes the unique state for which p({z, s∗}|s, a) = 1, then
p′(z|s, a) = 1 and u′(s, a) = − log(p(z|s, a)).
3Indeed, in such a state s it is optimal to choose such an action a, as it leads in one step to state s∗. Hence, such a
state can be deleted from the MDP, and each transition to state s can be rewritten as a transition directly to s∗.
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Intuitively, the MDP M′ represents what happens if in the original MDP M the decision
maker is unlucky at all periods: if moving to state s∗ in one step has a positive probability under
some (s, a), then the transition occurs to the unique state z 6= s∗ such that p({z, s∗}|s, a) = 1.
Notice that in the MDPM′, each action in each state leads to a specific state with probability 1.
Let σ be a pure Blackwell optimal stationary strategy in M′. We will show that σ satisfies
the condition of Theorem 4, that is, σ is not weakly overtaken by any other pure strategy.
Consider any other pure strategy ρ in M′. Since the MDP M′ is deterministic, each of
the pure strategies σ and ρ induces a specific infinite history in M′ with probability 1. Let
(st, at)t∈N denote the infinite history induced by σ and (zt, bt)t∈N denote the infinite history
induced by ρ.
In the original MDPM, the probability under σ that state s∗ is not reached within the first
t periods is 1− Ps1,σ(t
∗ ≤ t). This probability is related to the payoffs in the average payoff
MDPM′ as follows. For each period t ≥ 2 we have
log [1−Ps1,σ(t
∗ ≤ t)] = log
[
t−1
∏
k=1
p(sk+1|sk, ak)
]
=
t−1
∑
k=1
log [p(sk+1|sk, ak)]
= −
t−1
∑
k=1
u′(sk, ak)
= −(t− 1) · ut−1(s1, σ).
Similarly, we have
log
[
1−Ps1,ρ(t
∗ ≤ t)
]
= −
t−1
∑
k=1
u′(zk, bk) = −(t− 1) · ut−1(s1, ρ).
By the choice of σ in M′ (cf. Theorem 5), one of the following holds: (i) There is M ∈ N
such that for all periods t ≥ M we have ut(s1, σ) = ut(s1, ρ). (ii) There is a strictly increasing
sequence (tk)k∈N of periods such that for each k ∈ N we have utk(s1, σ) > utk(s1, ρ).
If (i) holds, then Ps1,σ(t
∗ ≤ t) = Ps1,ρ(t
∗ ≤ t) for all t ≥ M + 1, and hence ρ does not
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weakly overtake σ in the original MDPM.
If (ii) holds, then Ps1,σ(t
∗ ≤ tk) > Ps1,ρ(t
∗ ≤ tk) for each k ∈ N, and hence ρ does not
weakly overtake σ in the original MDPM in this case either.
The following example demonstrates that, even if the MDP with a reachability objective
is deterministic, an overtaking optimal strategy may fail to exist. In the example, each pure
strategy is equally good in the overtaking sense, but each pure strategy is overtaken by any
strategy that uses randomization at every period.
Example 2. Consider the MDP with a reachability objective that is depicted in Figure 2, where
the notation is similar to that of Example 1. The initial state is state x.
x y z
a : 12
b : 34 d : 0
e : 12
Figure 2: The MDP in Example 2.
When playing action b and subsequently action d, the accumulative probability during
these two periods of reaching the target state is 34 . Playing action a twice (or action e twice) leads
to the same accumulative probability, as 12 +
1
2 ·
1
2 =
3
4 . It follows that Pxσ(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1− 1
2t−1
,
for all pure strategies σ, except of the strategy σ′ = at−2b that plays the action a in the first t− 2
periods and the action b in period t − 1, for which Pxσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) > 1− 1
2t−1
. This will imply
that strategies that use randomization at state x at every period can do better in the overtaking
sense than all pure strategies. Indeed, given any period t ≥ 2, when calculating the probability
of reaching the target state within the first t periods, there is a positive probability that action b
is played exactly at period t− 1 (and thus we reach the target state exactly at the last period t),
while not having to include consequences of playing action d yet.
Claim 6. Consider Example 2. For each pure strategy σ, it holds for sufficiently large periods t that the
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probability of reaching the target state within the first t periods is
Pxσ(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1−
1
2t−1
.
In particular, no pure strategy is overtaken by another pure strategy.
Proof. For the pure strategy a∞ that plays a at all periods, we have for all periods t that
Pxa∞(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1−
1
2t−1
.
For any other pure strategy an−1b that plays a at the first n− 1 periods and plays b at period n,
we have for all periods t ≥ n+ 1 that
Px,an−1b(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1−
1
2n−2
·
1
4
· 1 ·
1
2t−n−1
= 1−
1
2t−1
.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 7. Consider Example 2. Take two strategies σ and σ′. Consider a period t ≥ 2. Then, Pxσ(t∗ ≤
t) > Pxσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) holds if and only if the probability under σ of being in state x and playing action b at
period t− 1 is strictly larger than that under σ′, i.e., Pxσ(at−1 = b) > Pxσ′(at−1 = b).
Consequently, if the condition Pxσ(at−1 = b) > Pxσ′(at−1 = b) holds for all sufficiently large
periods t, then σ overtakes σ′.
Proof. Suppose that when playing two strategies σ and σ′, it holds that for some period t ≥ 2
we have Pxσ(at−1 = b) > Pxσ′(at−1 = b).
On the finite horizon up to period t, the set of pure strategies isWt = {at, b, ab, a2b, . . . , at−1b}.
Under the pure strategy at−2b, the probability of reaching the target state within the first t pe-
riods is
Px,at−2b(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1−
1
2t−2
·
1
4
= 1−
1
2t
.
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Under each other pure strategy τ 6= at−1b, this probability is
Pxτ(t
∗ ≤ t) = 1−
1
2t−1
.
By Kuhn’s theorem, each of the strategies σ and σ′ can be seen as a probability distribution
over the set of pure strategiesWt. Hence, we have
Pxσ(t
∗ ≤ t) = ∑
τ∈W t
Pxσ(τ) ·Pxτ(t
∗ ≤ t)
= Pxσ(a
t−2b) ·
(
1−
1
2t
)
+ (1−Pxσ(a
t−2b)) ·
(
1−
1
2t−1
)
,
and similarly for the strategy σ′.
Thus, Pxσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Pxσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) holds if and only if Pxσ(at−2b) > Pxσ′(a
t−2b), which is
further equivalent with Pxσ(at−1 = b) > Pxσ′(at−1 = b). The proof is complete.
By Claim 7 above, the stationary strategy ( 12 ,
1
2)
∞ that always chooses action a and action b
each with probability 12 overtakes every pure strategy. Also, the stationary strategy (p, 1− p)
∞
overtakes the stationary strategy (q, 1− q)∞ if q < p < 1, as for large periods t we have
Px,(p,1−p)∞(at−1 = b) = p
t−2(1− p) > qt−2(1− q) = Px,(q,1−q)∞(at−1 = b).
This already shows that in Example 2 there is no stationary overtaking optimal strategy. We
now show that there is no overtaking optimal strategy at all.
Claim 8. In the MDP in Example 2 there exists no overtaking optimal strategy.
Proof. Consider any strategy σ. We construct a strategy that overtakes σ. The strategy σ can
be seen as a sequence (zn)∞n=1 where zn denotes the probability that σ assigns to action b when
being in state x at period n. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Assume that either zn = 0 for all periods n or zn = 1 for some period n. In this
case, Pxσ(an = b) = 0 at large periods n. Hence, by Claim 7, the stationary strategy (
1
2 ,
1
2)
∞
overtakes σ.
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Case 2: Assume that zm > 0 for some period m and zn < 1 for all periods n. We can
choose a sequence (z′n)
∞
n=1 such that (i) for all periods n = 1, . . . ,m− 1 we have z
′
n = zn, (ii)
for period m we have z′m < zm, (iii) for all periods n > m we have zn < z
′
n < 1, and (iv)
∏
∞
n=1(1− z
′
n) = ∏
∞
n=1(1− zn). The idea is to slightly reduce the probability zm at period m and
slightly increase all probabilities zn, n > m, so that (iv) holds, i.e., the total probability of ever
playing b under (zn)∞n=1 is equal to that under (z
′
n)
∞
n=1.
Let σ′ be the strategy corresponding to (z′n)
∞
n=1. Consider any period t > m. By (iii), we
have ∏∞n=t(1− z
′
n) ≤ ∏
∞
n=t(1− zn). Hence, by (iv), we obtain ∏
t−1
n=1(1− z
′
n) ≥ ∏
t−1
n=1(1− zn).
This means that the probability of being in state x at period t is at least as large under σ′ as
under σ. Thus, by (iii), we obtain Pxσ′(at = b) > Pxσ(at = b). Since this is true for all periods
t > m, in view of Claim 7, σ′ overtakes σ.
5 Reachability objectives: Non-deterministic MDPs
The following example, which is an adaptation of Example 2 to the context of non-deterministic
MDPs, shows that, in non-deterministic MDPs with a reachability objective, it can happen that
each pure strategy is overtaken by another pure strategy. As a consequence, Theorem 4 cannot
be extended to non-deterministic MDPs.
Example 3. Consider the MDP with initial state x and a reachability objective that is depicted
in Figure 3. In this MDP, the only choice of the decision maker is when to play action c, if at all,
and action c can be played at most once.
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x y
x′
z
a : 12
c d : 0(Prob.
1
2 ) :
3
4
e : 12
(Prob. 12 ) :
1
2
c′
(Prob. 12 ) :
3
4
(Prob. 12 ) :
1
2
Figure 3: The MDP in Example 3.
In this MDP, action c leads to the target state s∗ with probability 5/8, to state y with prob-
ability 1/8 and to state x′ with probability 1/4. It will be easier to think about action c in the
following way, which gives the same transition probabilities: After playing action c, a lottery
is executed: (1) with probability 1/2 the play follows the upper-part of the arrow, and thus the
play moves to state s∗ with probability 3/4 and to state y with probability 1/8, and (2) with
probability 1/2 the play follows the bottom-part of the arrow, and thus the play moves to state
s∗ with probability 1/2 and to state x′ with probability 1/2. Action c′ in state x′ has a similar
interpretation.
The pure strategies in this MDP are a∞, c, ac, a2c, . . .. The strategy a∞ corresponds to strat-
egy a∞ in Example 2, and the strategy atc corresponds to the mixed strategy in Example 2 that,
in state x, recommends action a up to period t and the mixed action ( 12 ,
1
2) at all periods after
t. The reader can verify that the strategy a∞ is overtaken by the strategy c, and each strategy
atc is overtaken by the strategy at+1c. That is, each pure strategy is overtaken by another pure
strategy.
Next, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of a strongly overtaking optimal
strategy.
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Theorem 9. Consider an MDP with a reachability objective. Suppose that, from every initial state,
there is a strategy that weakly overtakes all other strategies. Then, there exists a stationary strategy that
is strongly overtaking optimal for each initial state.
Proof. Note that if strategy σ weakly overtakes all other strategies, then σ is the unique strategy
with this property.
For each s ∈ S, let σs denote the unique strategy that weakly overtakes all other strategies
at the initial state s, and let αs denote the mixed action by σs at the initial state s.
Let α be the stationary strategy that uses the mixed action αs at state s, for all s ∈ S. Our
goal is to show that α is strongly overtaking optimal for each initial state.
Fix an initial state s ∈ S. For each state z, let Hs(z) denote the set of histories h such that (1)
h has a positive probability under σs from initial state s, and (2) h ends in state z. We show that
σs(h) = αz. Indeed, suppose byway of contradiction that σs(h) 6= αz. Let σ′s be the strategy such
that (i) σ′s follows σs outside the subgame at h, and (ii) in the subgame at h, the continuation
strategy σ[h] is replaced by σz. Then, for all t ≥ ||h||
Pσ′s
(t∗ ≤ t)−Pσs(t
∗ ≤ t) = Pσs(h) ·
[
Pz,σz(t
∗ ≤ t)−Pz,σ[h](t
∗ ≤ t)
]
.
Since σz weakly overtakes σ[h] for initial state z, we can conclude thatPz,σz(t
∗ ≤ t)−Pz,σ[h](t
∗ ≤
t) is non-negative for all large t and strictly positive for infinitely many t. Thus, the same holds
for Pσ′s(t
∗ ≤ t)−Pσs(t
∗ ≤ t), and hence σs is weakly overtaken by σ′s. This is a contradiction.
Hence, for each initial state s, each history h has the same probability under the strategy σs
and under the stationary strategy α. Using that σs weakly overtakes all other strategies, σs is
strongly overtaking optimal, and hence so is α. (In fact, σs = α must hold.)
6 Reachability objectives: Generic MDPs
In this section we consider generic MDPs with a reachability objective. The main result of this
section is the following theorem.
23
Theorem 10. In generic MDPs with a reachability objective, there is a pure stationary strategy that
overtakes each other stationary strategy at each initial state.
Let the state space be S = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, and let the target state be state s∗ = n.
We can assume without loss of generality that state n is absorbing.
In this sectionwe assume that the transition probabilities are randomized: for each state s ∈
S \ {n} and action a ∈ A(s), the probability distribution of the next state (p(z|s, a))z∈S is drawn
independently from some continuous distribution on {(q1, . . . , qn) ∈ (0, 1)
n | q1+ · · ·+ qn = 1}.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 10 is as follows. Every stationary strategy σ defines a
transition matrix Aσ. Under the strategy σ, the rate of absorption to state n is exactly λ2(Aσ),
the second largest eigenvalue of Aσ. Thus, if λ2(Aσ) < λ2(Aσ′), then σ overtakes σ
′ for the
reachability objective. Let A1, A2, · · · , AK be all transition matrices that are induced by pure
stationary strategies. Generically, the second largest eigenvalues of these matrices differ, and
therefore there is one of them, say, A1, whose second largest eigenvalue is minimal. The matrix
Aσ is in the convex hull of the matrices A1, A2, · · · , AK, and we will prove that if Aσ 6= A1 then
λ2(Aσ) > λ2(A1). This will imply that the pure stationary strategy that corresponds to the
matrix A1 overtakes each other stationary strategy at each initial state.
The proof of Theorem 10 consists of four steps.
Step 1: Proving that the second largest eigenvalue determines the overtaking relation between
stationary strategies: When comparing two stationary strategies σA and σB generating
the respective transitions matrices A and B, λ2(A) < λ2(B) implies that σA overtakes σB
at each initial state.
Step 2: Proving that the second largest eigenvalue of a transition matrix A, corresponding to a
stationary strategy, is equal to the largest eigenvalue of the (n− 1) × (n− 1) submatrix
A′ that remains when from A we remove the column and the row associated with the
target state: λ2(A) = λ1(A
′).
Step 3: Proving that for two positive square matrices A and B that differ only in one row, the
largest eigenvalue of any convex combination of the two matrices cannot be lower than
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the minimum between the largest eigenvalues of the twomatrices: for every α ∈ (0, 1)we
have λ1(αA+ (1− α)B) ≥ min {λ1(A),λ1(B)}, and if λ(A) 6= λ(B) then the inequality
is strict.
Step 4: Proving that it is sufficient to consider only matrices that differ in one row. This implies
that the pure stationary strategy that corresponds to the transition matrix with minimal
second largest eigenvalue overtakes each other stationary strategy, at each initial state.
Proof of Step 1: The statement of Step 1 follows from the combination of Theorem 4 and The-
orem 6 in De Santis and Spizzichino (2012).4
Proof of Step 2: Let σ be a stationary strategy with transition matrix
A =

x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 . . . x1,n
x2,1 x2,2 x2,3 . . . x2,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn−1,1 xn−1,2 xn−1,3 . . . xn−1,n
0 0 0 . . . 1

,
with entry (i, j) being the probability under σ of moving to state j from state i. Since the
transition probabilities of the MDP are randomized, it holds generically that xi,j > 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and j = 1, . . . , n. The sum of entries in each row of the matrix A is equal to 1,
and hence the largest eigenvalue of A is 1, with eigenvector (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1).
Consider also the submatrix of A that arises when we delete the last column and the last
4These two theorems in De Santis and Spizzichino (2012) imply for every initial state s = 1, . . . , n − 1 that
Ps,σA(t
∗ ≤ t) ≥ Ps,σB(t
∗ ≤ t) for large t ∈ N. However, their proof can be easily adapted to show that Ps,σA(t
∗ ≤
t) > Ps,σB(t
∗ ≤ t) for large t ∈ N, so that strategy σA overtakes strategy σB. Indeed, the inequalities (37) and (38)
on page 12 do not only imply ∑ℓj=0 p˜
(n)
i,j ≥ ∑
ℓ
j=0 p
(n)
i,j , but they even imply the strict inequality.
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row (which correspond to the target state):
A′ =

x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 . . . x1,n−1
x2,1 x2,2 x2,3 . . . x2,n−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn−1,1 xn−1,2 xn−1,3 . . . xn−1,n−1

.
According to the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, the largest eigenvalue λ1(A
′) of the matrix A′ is a
real number. As the sum of entries in each row of A′ is strictly less than 1, we have λ1(A
′) < 1.
The proof that λ1(A
′) is the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix A follows from the
following two observations:
(i) Any eigenvalue of A′ is also an eigenvalue of A. Indeed, let µ be an eigenvalue of A′
with right eigenvector (y1, . . . , yn−1).
5 Then µ is an eigenvalue of A with right eigenvector
(y1, . . . , yn−1, 0).
(ii) If µ 6= 1 be an eigenvalue of A, then µ is also an eigenvalue of A′. Indeed, let y =
(y1, . . . , yn) be a right eigenvector of A corresponding to µ. Then, Ay = µy. This implies
yn = µ · yn, which is only possible if yn = 0. Hence, µ is an eigenvalue of A′ with eigenvector
(y1, . . . , yn−1).
Proof of Step 3: The statement of Step 3 follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Let A and B be two positive (all elements are positive) square matrices that differ only
in the first row. For every α ∈ (0, 1) define Mα := αA + (1− α)B. We will prove that λ1(Mα) ≥
min {λ1(A),λ1(B)}, and, if λ1(A) 6= λ1(B), then λ1(Mα) > min {λ1(A),λ1(B)}.
Remark 12. If the two matrices A and B differ in several rows, then Theorem 11 is no longer true. To
see that, consider the following matrices:
A =

98
300
98
300
1
300
98
300
1
300
1
300
1
300
1
300
1
300
 , B =

1
300
1
300
1
300
1
300
1
300
98
300
1
300
98
300
98
300
 .
5Recall that the same set of eigenvalues correspond both to right and left eigenvectors.
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For these matrices, λ1(A) = λ1(B) = 0.529522, while λ1
(
1
2A+
1
2B
)
= 13 < 0.529522.
We present two proofs for Theorem 11.6
First Proof. Denote λ∗ = λ1(Mα).
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists a positive right eigenvector u = (uj)j corre-
sponding to λ∗ for thematrixMα. Let ej be the j’th unit vector. Note that uj is the j’th coordinate
of u, while ej is the j’th unit vector. For every j 6= 1 we have e
T
j A = e
T
j B, hence e
T
j Au = e
T
j Bu.
Since
λ∗uj = λ
∗eTj u = e
T
j Mαu = αe
T
j Au+ (1− α)e
T
j Bu,
we deduce that
eTj Au = e
T
j Bu = λ
∗uj, ∀j 6= 1. (3)
For j = 1 we have
λ∗u1 = λ
∗eT1 u = e
T
1 Mαu = αe
T
1 Au+ (1− α)e
T
1 Bu.
Assume w.l.o.g. that eT1 Au ≥ e
T
1 Bu, so that
eT1 Au ≥ λ
∗u1 ≥ e
T
1 Bu. (4)
It follows from Eqs. (3) and (4) that for every nonnegative vector v we have
vTAu ≥ λ∗vTu ≥ vTBu. (5)
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists a positive right eigenvector vA for λ1(A), and a
positive right eigenvector vB for λ1(B). Substituting v = vA in the left-hand side of Ineq. (5)
and substituting v = vB in the right-hand side of Ineq. (5) we obtain
λ1(A)v
T
Au = v
T
AAu ≥ λ
∗vTAu, (6)
6We thank Robert Israel for suggesting the first proof, and Omri Solan for suggesting the second proof.
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and
λ1(B)v
T
Bu = v
T
BBu ≤ λ
∗vTBu. (7)
Since vTAu and v
T
Bu are positive reals, this implies that λ1(A) ≥ λ
∗ ≥ λ1(B).
Suppose now that λ1(A) > λ1(B). Then necessarily e
T
1 Au > e
T
1 Bu, since, if the two are
equal, then there would have been equality in Eq. (5), and then we would obtain that λ1(A) =
λ1(B). As all coordinates of vA and vB are positive, and in particular the first coordinates are
positive, there is a strict inequality in Eqs. (6) and (7).
Second Proof. Assume to the contrary that the function α 7→ λ1(Mα) is not monotone. Then
there exist 0 < α1 < α2 < α3 < α4 < 1 such that λ1(Mα2) < λ1(Mα1) = λ1(Mα3) < λ1(Mα4).
Set λ = λ1(Mα1) = λ1(Mα3).
For every x ∈ Rn++ denote by Ax the matrix that coincides with A, except that its first row
is x. Denote by MA := {Ax : x ∈ R
n
++} the space of all these matrices. The space MA is
equivalent to Rn++.
By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem the largest eigenvalue of a positive matrix is a positive
real. Denote by f : Rn++ → R the function that assigns to each x ∈ R
n
++ the largest eigenvalue
of the matrix Ax, that is, f (x) = λ1(Ax). Since the function that maps each x to the norm of the
largest eigenvalue is continuous, the function f is continuous.
Denote by Hλ = {x : det(λI − Ax) = 0} ⊆ R
n
++ the set of all matrices that have λ as an
eigenvalue. The function x 7→ det(λI − Ax) is linear, hence the set Hλ is the intersection of a
hyperspace with Rn++. Plainly, {x : f (x) = λ} ⊆ Hλ. We will show that {x : f (x) = λ} = Hλ.
On the one hand, the complement of the set {x : f (x) = λ} is the union of the two sets
{x : f (x) > λ} and {x : f (x) < λ}. Note that these two sets are non-empty, because λ1(Mα2) <
λ and λ1(Mα4) > λ. The continuity of f implies that the set {x : f (x) 6= λ} is disconnected.
On the other hand, the complement of the set {x : f (x) = λ} is the union of the two half-
spaces {x : det(λI − Ax) > 0} and {x : det(λI − Ax) < 0}, and of the set Hλ \ {x : f (x) = λ}.
If the latter set were nonempty, then the union of the three sets would have been connected, a
contradiction.
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It follows that {x : f (x) = λ} = Hλ. This in particular implies that λ1(Mα1) = λ1(Mα2) =
λ1(Mα3) = λ1(Mα4), which contradicts the choice of α1, α2, α3, α4. Consequently, if λ1(A) =
λ1(B) then the function α 7→ λ1(Mα) is constant, while if λ1(A) 6= λ1(B) then the function α 7→
λ1(Mα) is strictly monotone. Observe that this result is slightly stronger than the statement of
the theorem.
Proof of Step 4: Let A1, A2, · · · , AK be all transition matrices that are induced by pure station-
ary strategies. Generically, the second largest eigenvalues of these matrices are all different.
Assume that λ2(A1) < λ2(Ai) for all i = 2, . . . , n. Let σ be the pure stationary strategy corre-
sponding to the transition matrix A1.
Let τ be a stationary strategy, and let A be the transition matrix corresponding to τ. For
every r = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 let Br be the collection of all matrices that coincide with A in the first r
rows, and coincide with one of the matrices A1, A2, · · · , AK in the other n− r rows. Note that
B0 = {A1, A2, · · · , AK}. Using Step 2 together with Step 3 inductively we obtain that
λ2(A) ≥ min
B∈Bn−1
λ2(B) ≥ min
B∈Bn−2
λ2(B) ≥ · · · ≥ min
B∈B0
λ2(B). (8)
Moreover, if A /∈ B0, then at least one of the inequalities in Eq. (8) is strict.
Now assume that τ 6= σ. If A /∈ B0 then λ2(A) > minB∈B0 λ2(B) = λ2(A1), whereas if
A ∈ B0 then λ2(A) > λ2(A1) by the choice of A1. Thus, by Step 1, σ overtakes τ at each initial
state. ✷
Remark 13. Consider a generic MDP with a reachability objective. According to Theorem 10, there is
a pure stationary strategy σ that overtakes each other stationary strategy at each initial state. Given any
stationary strategy σ′ 6= σ and initial state s, one can compute a horizon T such that σ outperforms σ′
beyond T: for all t ≥ T we have Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t). For the details we refer to the Appendix.
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7 Safety objectives
In this section we consider MDPs with a safety objective: the decision maker’s objective is to
avoid the state s∗ with a probability as high as possible.
The statement of Theorem 4: The statement remains valid for safety objectives. The proof
requires the following changes:
(1) For the MDP M, we can still assume without loss of generality that there is no state
s 6= s∗ and action a ∈ A(s) such that p(s∗|s, a) = 1, but the reason is different. Such an action is
the worst for the decision maker, so it can be deleted. If all actions in a state swould be deleted,
then we can delete the state s and replace each transition to state s by a transition directly to
state s∗.
(2) The payoffs in the auxiliary MDP M′ is defined to be the opposite of the payoff in the
proof of Theorem 4: if z 6= s∗ denotes the unique state for which p({z, s∗}|s, a) = 1, then the
payoff is u′(s, a) = log(p(z|s, a)). The reason is that, now with a safety objective, the decision
maker prefers that p(z|s, a) is large.
The statements of Theorem 9 and Theorem 10: The statements remain valid for safety objec-
tives, with proofs that are almost identical to the ones for reachability objectives.
The counter-part of Example 2: Also for safety objectives, we can construct an MDP in which
the decision maker has no overtaking optimal strategy. Indeed, take the MDP in Example 2,
and replace b : 34 with b : 0 and replace d : 0 with d :
3
4 . That is, now action b leads to state
s∗ with probability 0 and action d leads to state s∗ with probability 34 . In this MDP with the
safety objective, by comparing the transition probabilities, action b is still to be preferred over
action d. It can be proven with similar arguments that this MDP admits no overtaking optimal
strategy.
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8 Concluding remarks
It remains an open problem if generic MDPs with a reachability objective admit a pure station-
ary strategy that is strongly overtaking optimal. To prove Theorem 10, we relied on techniques
from linear algebra. When one allows non-stationary strategies, the transition probabilities
may change period by period, perhaps even depending on the past play. Thus, in general, the
transition probabilities can no longer be described by a single transition matrix, which compli-
cates the analysis.
We investigated MDPs with reachability and safety objectives. Our solution concept of
overtaking optimality for these MDPs may pave the way to define an overtaking solution con-
cept for two-player zero-sum perfect information games. In these games, each state is con-
trolled by one of the players. We can assume that Player 1’s goal is to reach a certain state as
quickly as possible, and Player 2’s goal is to reach that state as slowly as possible. One pos-
sible solution concept for these games would be a pair of pure stationary strategies such that,
given the opponent’s strategy, each player’s strategy is (strongly) overtaking optimal. The right
notion and its existence require further investigation.
When the decision maker uses a stationary strategy, the transition probabilities are de-
scribed by a transition matrix. In several situations, it can be important to study the proba-
bility distribution of the current state, at any period t, on condition that the state s∗ has not
been reached yet. This conditional distribution can be expressed with the help of the transition
matrix, and it converges under some conditions to a limit, called a quasi-stationary distribu-
tion. This convergence and its speed are both subject of study in the literature, see for example
Diaconis and Miclo (2015).
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9 Appendix: Computing the horizon T from which the optimal strat-
egy in the generic case overtakes other stationary strategies
As in Section 6, suppose that the target state s∗ is absorbing and that for all states s, z ∈ S \ {s∗}
and action a ∈ A(s), the transition probability p(z|s, a) is strictly positive.
Let Aσ be the transition matrix corresponding to a stationary strategy σ. Take arbitrary
states s, z ∈ S \ {s∗}. Wewill make use of inequalities (37) and (38) in De Santis and Spizzichino
(2012) to bound the probability Atσ(s, z) of moving from state s to state z in t steps, under the
strategy σ.
Inequality (37) bounds Atσ(s, z) from above. This bound uses the second highest eigenvalue
of the transition matrix, that we refer to as λ2(Aσ) and states that: there exists c > 0 such that
for all t ∈ N we have Atσ(s, z) ≤ c · t
|S|(λ2(A))t. The constant c is obtained from the Jordan
form representation of the matrix Aσ.
Inequality (38) obtains a lower bound for Atσ(s, z): there exists c˜ > 0 and m ∈ N such that
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for all t ≥ mwe have Atσ(s, z) ≥ c˜ · (λ2(A))
t. The constant c˜ and the bound m are also obtained
from the Jordan form representation of the matrix Aσ.
Now take two stationary strategies σ and σ′, and assume that λ2(Aσ) < λ2(Aσ′). Let s ∈
S \ {s∗} be the initial state. Given the two inequalities above, we can find T ∈ N such that σ
outperforms σ′ beyond T: for all t > T, we have Pσ(t∗ ≤ t) > Pσ′(t
∗ ≤ t). Indeed, choose
T ≥ mwhich satisfies T|S|
(
λ2(Aσ)
λ2(Aσ′ )
)T
<
c˜
c . Then, for all periods t ≥ T and all states z ∈ S \ {s
∗},
we have Atσ(s, z) < A
t
σ′(s, z). Hence, for all periods t > T, we have
At−1σ (s, s
∗) = 1− ∑
z∈S\{s∗}
At−1σ (s, z) > 1− ∑
z∈S\{s∗}
At−1σ′ (s, z) = A
t−1
σ′ (s, s
∗).
Using Psσ(t∗ ≤ t) = At−1σ (s, s
∗) and Psσ′(t
∗ ≤ t) = At−1σ′ (s, s
∗), the claim follows.
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